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Lies, Damn Lies, and Claims of
Judicial Activism
Michael Vitiello*

I.

Introduction

Even though my crystal ball was in
the repair shop on May 15, 2008, I predicted that the blogosphere would be filled with attacks on the California
Supreme Court's same-sex marriage
cases. More specifically, I knew that the
bloggers would attack the decision as another example of judicial activism. Of
course, I was right.,
While I was delighted to be invited to
participate in this symposium on In re
Marriage Cases2 and judicial activism, I

am agnostic about the wisdom of such an
inquiry. Serious scholars throw up their
hands when they attempt to define judicial activism and usually conclude, as I
do, that "judicial activism" is simply a pejorative term that expresses one's disa3
greement with a court's decision.
Serious scholars might be able to
come up with a meaningful definition of
judicial activism. In the past, I have dabbled with the topic and largely given up
hope of coming up with a definitive

* Distinguished Professor and Scholar, Pacific McGeorge School of Law, J.D. University of Pennsylvania,
1974; B.A. Swarthmore College, 1969. Special thanks to my research assistant Cammy Desmond for her help
in preparing this essay.
1. See, e.g., Posting of Curt Levey to Committee for Justice blog, http://www.committeeforjustice.org
blog/2008/05/gay-marriage-decision-should-be.html (May 15, 2008, 16:57 EST); posting of James Joyner to
Outside the Beltway blog, http: /lwww.outsidethebeltway.com/archives/judicialactivism-uersus-judging/
(May 16, 2008); posting of Kent Scheidegger to Crime and Consequences blog, http://www.crimeandconse(May 19, 2008,
quences.com/cgi-bin/mt/mt-search.cgi?search=judicial+activism&IncludeBlogs=l&limit=20
14:22 EST); posting of Mike Volpe to The Provocateur blog, http://theeprovocateur.blogspot.com/2008/05/judicial-activism-gay-marriage-and.html (May 20, 2008, 8:52 EST); posting of Ryan McCann to Veritas Rex blog,
http://veritasrex.typepad.com/veritas-rex/2008/06/the-most-egregi.html (June 6, 2008, 8:00 EST); posting of
aconservativeview to Conservative America blog, http://theconservativeamerica.wordpress.com/2008/07/21/judicial-activism-and-special-interests/ (July 21, 2008, 17:40 EST).
2. 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
3. See generally, KERMIT ROOSEVELT II1, THE MYTH OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM: MAKING SENSE OF SUPREME
CoURT DECISIONS (Yale Univ. Press 2006).
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description of activism.4 Many claims of
judicial activism focus on the court's willingness to frustrate popular sentiment
reflected in legislation, to abandon settled precedent, to intrude upon states'
rights in violation of our federal union,
and to disregard the original understanding of the Constitution. 5 While those
claiming that a court is activist usually
point to these factors, perhaps among
others, a serious look at activism would
ask why some instances where the Court
engages in that kind of behavior are the
source of praise. Brown v. Board of Educatione comes to mind as a case that was
criticized as activist in its day, but that
now has few critics. Even arch-conservatives find ways to defend its result. 7 As a
result, were scholars to take up the project of defining "judicial activism" meaningfully, they would have to parse
"judicial activism" even further and decide whether some activism is good and
some bad.
I might have a few thoughts to add to
that conversation. For example, some activism might be justified when the politi-

cal process has failed. Baker v. Carr
comes to mind, holding that equal protection required that states follow a "oneman-one-vote" rule." If activism is wrong
because it overrides the democratic process, the Court's "activism" (for example,
in overruling established precedent, holding such matters to be political questions)
was necessary to correct the democratic
process in the first instance. Or activism
may be justified in some instances where
the beneficiaries of the Court's activism
have little access to the ballot or, in the
words of footnote four in Carolene Products, are a part of a discrete and insular
minority. 9 Suffice it to say that the project would take far more than the 5000
words that I have been allotted for this
essay.
So instead of attempting to define "judicial activism," or even to say much in
its defense (other than to note that sometimes, almost everyone wants the Court
to be activist on behalf of his or her
cause), I want to offer a conversation that
one can have to see if those shouting "judicial activism" are merely crying wolf or

4. See, e.g., Michael Vitiello, California'sThree Strikes and We're Out: Was JudicialActivism California's
Best Hope?, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1025, 1028 n.19 (2004) ("I am tempted to call both the Ninth Circuit and the
state appellate courts "activist" in their willingness to ignore settled precedent. Defining 'activism,' however, is
contentious."); Michael Vitiello, How Imperial is the Supreme Court?An Analysis of Supreme Court Abortion
Doctrine and the Popular Will, 34 U.S.F. L. REV. 49, 98 (1999) ("IT]he Constitution .. .built in significant
limitations that prevent Article III courts from becoming politically unaccountable.").
5. See ROOSEVELT, supra note 3, at 38-39 (discussing different attempts to define "judicial activism").
6. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
7. See, e.g., Lino A. Graglia, Interpretingthe Constitution: Posner on Bork, 44 STAN. L. REV. 1019, 1043
(1992) (arguing that Brown is consistent with originalism and that, "[oin legal grounds, the prohibition [of
racial discrimination] has a strong, arguably adequate, textual-historical constitutional basis."). Graglia also
discusses Robert H. Bork's attempt to justify Brown on Constitutional grounds. Id. ("[T]he result in Brown is
consistent with, indeed is compelled by, the original understanding of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause." (quoting ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
76 (Free Press; Collier Macmillan 1990))).
8. 369 U.S. 186, 329 (1962).
9. 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
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if they are actually using the term in a
meaningful and principled manner.
At the outset, I should explain that
some scholars, judges and lawyers have a
real aversion to judges overruling the will
of the people, expressed through legislation, to judges ignoring federalism concerns, and to ignoring the original
understanding of the Constitution.1° In
some instances, an occasional article or
judicial opinion shows that a scholar or
judge follows those values, even when it
produces results that the scholar or judge
would disfavor. 1 Thus, a libertarian
judge might vote to uphold abortion
rights despite his personal disapproval of
abortion.12 Or a federalist judge might
vote to uphold state legislation supporting affirmative action because she genuinely takes seriously the power of the
state to decide such questions. 13 Following one's principles with consistency in
today's charged political climate is unusual, even in the academy, but it is not
unheard of.
This essay offers a test to determine
if those crying "judicial activism" are
principled in their objections to the
court's action or whether they are simply
spitting dirty words. Below, I describe a

conversation that takes place in my Civil
Procedure class on a regular basis when
we discuss the rather curious case of
Burnham v. Superior Court.14 For all
nine members of the Court, the result
seemed like a foregone conclusion. But
Justices Scalia and Brennan produced
fireworks. Unraveled, the case is about
sharply contrasting judicial philosophies,
pitting Scalia's traditionalism against
Brennan's living Constitution. Class discussion offers me a chance to test my students' commitment to results or to
principles and the questions that I ask
can help you sort out the same thing. After discussing Burnham and my students' reactions to it, I use Bush v. Gore 5
and In re Marriage Casesl6 as a pointcounterpoint in a further discussion of judicial activism, and I offer another set of
questions for those who cry "judicial activism." Comparing the two cases in light
of what most commentators seem to have
in mind when they use the term "judicial
activism," I argue that Bush v. Gore
makes In re Marriage Cases look tame.
In fact, while the California Supreme
Court's conclusion was not inevitable in
light of existing constitutional text and
case law, it does not represent a radical

10. Ironically, based on their votes, "liberal" Justice Steven Breyer is more deferential to the legislative
branches of government than is originalist Justice Antonin Scalia. See THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST
SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY 251 (Univ. of Chicago Press 2004).
11. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, In Defense of Looseness, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 27, 2008, http:I/
www.tnr.com/toc/story.html.
12. Despite Justice Anthony Kennedy's moral disdain for abortion, he joined the majority opinion in
PlannedParenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvaniav. Casey affirming Roe v. Wade's essential holding recognizing a woman's right to choose. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
13. See, e.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 341-42 (2003).
14. 495 U.S. 604 (1990).
15. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
16. 43 Cal. 4th 757 (2008).
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departure from precedent. Instead, it extends the logic of existing cases. By comparison, Bush v. Gore was a product of
whole cloth and a dramatic departure
from precedent.
To be sure that my readers read all
the way through this essay, I mention
here by way of introduction that I offer a
novel solution to the overuse of the term
"judicial activism." Read on.
II.

Burnham v. Superior Court

Civil Procedure buffs no doubt share
my fascination with Burnham, more for
the Justices' antics than for any other aspect of the case. The case arose out of divorce proceedings in California.'
The
parties lived in New Jersey before the
wife moved to California with the couple's
children.' Unable to agree on where to
file their divorce proceedings, the wife
filed for divorce in California. 9 At the
end of a business trip and weekend with
one of his children, his wife served him
with process.2 0 The defendant challenged
the assertion of jurisdiction as a violation
21
of due process.

All nine Justices found the case to be
an easy one. In a rare 9-0 decision, the
Court upheld the assertion of jurisdiction.22 Beyond the result, though, the
Justices used sharp language to describe
one another's position. Justice Scalia's
opinion relied heavily on the fact that
service in state has a long historical pedigree. While some of his language hints at
an originalist approach to the question
before the Court, Justice Scalia could not
argue that the Court should follow the
original constitutional understanding of
personal jurisdiction. To do so would be
to return to the now largely overruled ap2
proach of Pennoyer v. NeffY.
Instead, he
underscored the importance of tradition
in interpreting the meaning of due process. In fact, his plurality opinion used
the words "tradition" and "traditional" 32
times.
Justice Scalia's rebuttal of Justice
Brennan's concurring opinion was sharp.
He contrasted his approach to that of
Justice Brennan and argued that reliance
on tradition avoided subjectivity inherent
24
in unguided assessments of fairness.

17. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 607.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 607-08.
20. Id. at 608.
21. Id.
22. Perhaps I am showing my true colors as a potential activist. Despite the traditional rule, articulated
in Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877), given the dramatic changes in the law of personal jurisdiction, I think
that the case presented a close legal issue. I offer my students the following hypothetical to make that point:
Had Burnham outrun the process server and boarded his plane just ahead of process server, the court would
have lacked jurisdiction. In a case presenting remarkably similar facts, except that the plaintiff attempted to
use long-arm service of process, the Court found that the assertion of jurisdiction violated due process. Kulko
v. Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 (1978). Also, in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977) the Court stated specifically that all assertions of jurisdiction had to satisfy the Court's modern minimum contacts due process standard.
23. 23. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
24. Burnham, 495 U.S. at 623.
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More particularly, he ridiculed the application of Justice Brennan's assessment of
fairness as applied to the facts of the case
before the Court.25 For example, he argued that under Justice Brennan's analysis, the assertion of jurisdiction was "fair"
because of the meager benefits that the
defendant received during his three day
stay in California. 6 Justice Scalia argued
that such a bargain (whereby California's
courts got to "decree the ownership of all
Mr. Burnham's worldly goods acquired
during the ten years of his marriage, and
the custody over his children" in exchange for those three days of benefits)
would be unconscionable under the Uniform Commercial Code.27 Further, he
contended that Justice Brennan's analysis was merely "tradition masquerading
as 'fairness;"' that is, the defendant was
on notice that he might be haled into
court only because of the wide recognition
of the traditional rule of personal ser2
vice. 8
Finally, he stated most clearly what
was at stake in the case: not the result by
any means. Instead, the difference between them was "whether changes are to
be adopted as progressive by the American people or decreed as progressive by
the Justices of this Court."29 For him, the
question was "whether, armed with no
Id. at 623-26.
Id. at 623-24.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 624-25.
Id. at 627.
Burnham, 495 U.S. at 627.
Id. at 629 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Id. at 631-33.
Id. at 628 (White, J., concurring).

authority other than individual Justices'
perceptions of fairness that conflict with
both past and current practice, this Court
can compel the States to make such a
change on the ground that 'due process'
3°
requires it."
Tamer in tone, Justice Brennan's concurring opinion marshaled a long list of
cases and scholarly commentary to rebut
much of what Justice Scalia argued. At
its core was the fact that "reliance solely
on historical pedigree ... is foreclosed by"
the Court's case law. 3 1 Further, he accused Justice Scalia of engaging in "nimble gymnastics" to avoid the effect of the
Court's analysis in Shaffer v. Heitner, a
case that contradicted much of what Justice Scalia asserted.32
Perhaps because the two Justices
were so forceful in their rhetoric in a case
where so little was at stake, Justices
White and Stevens did not fully subscribe
to either view. Justice White refused to
join the section of Justice Scalia's opinion
that sharply criticized Justice Brennan's
general approach to due process and left
open whether he would join Justice
Scalia's bright line rule in a case in which
a defendant was not intentionally in the
forum.3 Justice Stevens, the swing vote
since Justice Brennan had four votes and
Justice Scalia three and a half, said little
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to explain his position.3 4 Hence, at the
end of the day, whether lower courts
should follow the bright line rule of Justice Scalia or the case-by-case approach of
Justice Brennan remains an open question.
In addition to leaving the law in
limbo, their disagreement means little in
the personal jurisdiction arena. Several
years ago, I researched whether lower
courts followed Justice Scalia or Justice
Brennan's approach. While lower courts
have cited Burnham, few cases, if any,
turned on the differences between the
5
two opinions.
After having students brief the case
and discuss the differences between the
two opinions, I lead my students through
a series of questions to get them to see
how little was at stake based on the facts
of the case before the Court. As indicated, the Court was unanimous and,
given the ready availability of long-arm
statutes and expanded notions of due process, plaintiffs seldom need to resort to
in-hand service in a forum with little connection with the litigation and with the
defendant. I then ask them why Justices
Scalia and Brennan spent so much energy on a case that meant so little. Eventually, they see that their differences
were about other cases before the Court,
most likely, about abortion cases and

other cases involving an approach to due
3 6
process and equal protection.
Despite the current exhortation to
have our students voice their personal
views, I usually avoid such irrelevant
chatter. Not so when I discuss Burnham.
When I ask students whether Justice
Brennan or Scalia has the better legal argument, the discussion now follows a typical pattern. The discussion is dominated
by conservative students who contend
that, of course, Justice Scalia has the better of the argument.
They start with the assertion that the
role of the Court is not to make law, but
to interpret the law. That, of course, is a
typical premise of those claiming that judicial activists "legislate from the bench."
When I ask why that is a problem, they
argue that the judiciary in such cases is
intruding on the role of the legislature,
obviously a separation of powers argument. But they are less clear where to
find that distinction in the law. Many
have heard it repeated so often by conservative commentators that they assume that it is clearly stated in our law.
The more astute students argue that the
principle is found in the Constitution.
When I ask whether the Court is not the
proper body to interpret the due process
clause, some students contend that the
Court should not use the due process

34. See id. at 640 (Stevens, J., concurring).
35. The kinds of examples that law professors use, like a case in which the plaintiff serves the defendant
with process while the defendant is flying over Kansas are fun to use in class but do not exist frequently in the
real world. Almost all of the cases involving transient presence within the state involved claims of fraud or
involved situations where the defendant's contacts with the forum state were ample.
36. See JEFFREY TOOBIN, THE NINE: INSIDE THE SECRET WORLD OF THE SUPREME COURT 15 (2007) ("In
large measure, the debate over original intent amounted to a proxy for the legal struggle over legalized abortion.").
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clause to expand rights, but that it should
be limited in scope by tradition. Here, a
few students articulate a preference for
the original understanding of the Constitution (or here, the fourteenth amendment) as a way to check "liberal" judges
from imposing their preferences on the
majority of Americans. In other words,
many of my students share the view of
bloggers and other critics of judicial activism.
I am not sure why my liberal students do not stick up for Justice Brennan.
Were they to do so, I would have a different set of questions for them. But once I
have my conservative students commit to
the position in the previous paragraph, I
ask them a series of questions aimed at
exploring whether they are against judicial activism or against specific rulings,
like Roe v. Wade .37
For example, I ask them whether the
idea that legislatures, not judges, make
the law is ingrained in the Constitution.
They are surprised by the fact that our
current view of the separation of powers
between the legislature and courts is of
relatively recent origin. We have yet to
3
study Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins ,
but I explain its role in defining modern
rules governing separation of powers. As
developed so artfully in Edward A. Purcell, Jr.'s Brandeis and the Progressive
Constitution, Erie rejected a long history
of judicial lawmaking. Purcell traced numerous instances in which (usually) con-

servative Justices found that the Court
had far broader power to "legislate" than
the Congress. 9 The point, of course, is
that if one contends to be an originalist,
she has trouble contending that the
Court lacks the authority to "make" law.
Depending on how much time we
have to devote to this jurisprudential
point, sometimes I mention other realities of the American legal system. For
example, the common law system implicitly recognizes the power of judges to
make law. While the Constitution may
have altered that relationship somewhat,
as indicated in the previous paragraph,
for many years, Justices acted as if they
had common law adjudicatory power.
And even in a post-Erie era, the Supreme
Court has recognized its power to make
common law. On the same day as the
Court announced the Erie decision, it
handed down Hinderlider v. La Plata
River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., a case in
which the Court relied on federal common law to resolve an interstate water
dispute.40
Nonetheless, some students contend
that, apart from the original understanding of the Framers, separation of power
makes good sense. In most cases, it
surely does. As Justice Breyer has argued forcefully in Active Liberty 41 democracy requires that unelected judges give
great deference to the legislative branch.
Further, excessive judicial activism does
risk the substitution of personal values

37.
38.
39.
40.

410 U.S. 113 (1973).
304 U.S. 64 (1938).
EDWARD A. PURCELL,
304 U.S. 92 (1938).

41.

STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION

JR., BRANDEIS AND THE PROGRESSIVE CONSTITUTION

(2000).

(2006).
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for that of the majority of Americans. Of
course, conservative students who have
touted the limited role of the judiciary are
unhappy to learn that leading conservative Justices, including Justice Scalia,
have routinely overruled legislation. Indeed, as Thomas M. Keck demonstrates
in his book The Most Activist Supreme
Court in History, Justices Scalia and
Thomas have voted to strike down statutes more frequently than the Court's
2
more liberal members.4
Some students still want to hold on to
originalism as a way to curtail judges
from imposing their values on society. In
the context of personal jurisdiction, they
are fairly quick to abandon that rigid position because almost all students agree
with the Court's case law that overruled
its narrow approach in Pennoyer v. Neff.
That is, they have bought into the evolution of the law in that setting. Some students nonetheless argue that due process
is such an open-ended concept that it can
mean anything. At that point, I ask if
they are familiar with Bush v. Gore.
While most students are, like many other
Americans, few are familiar with the
Court's basis of decision. As developed in
more detail below, Bush v. Gore is remarkable in a number of ways, most notably in the complete lack of authority for
its finding that the Florida Supreme
Court's approach to counting the vote (excluding over-inclusive ballots) violated
equal protection.
The exercise with my class suggests a
line of questioning that one might direct

to those claiming that a particular judicial decision is activist and that the
courts overstep their bounds when they
strike down popular legislation. Few
critics of the courts are willing to follow
their critique in a principled manner. At
a minimum, those who are both originalists and believers in separation of powers
must recognize the conflict between those
principles. Further, any claim of liberal
activism can be countered with examples
of conservative activism. Perhaps, a rare
individual will toe a consistent line and
reject Bush v. Gore as well as other expansive interpretations of due process.
But like the true innocent, such individuals are hard to find.
III.

Legislating from the Bench?

During the tense days between the
2000 election and the Supreme Court's
decision, I had a number of conversations
with non-lawyer friends who wanted to
know how the Court might decide Bush v.
Gore. I was naively optimistic because
the case presented a test for the conservative Justices on the Court. At stake
were principles of federalism, judicial restraint, and narrow construction of constitutional rights. Of course, much to my
regret (and now, no doubt, many millions
of Americans unhappy with the Bush
presidency), none of the Court's conservatives agreed. In preparing this essay, I
reread the per curiam opinion and was
even more stunned at how inadequate

42. THOMAS M. KECK, THE MOST ACTIVIST SUPREME COURT IN HISTORY: THE ROAD TO MODERN JUDICIAL
CONSERVATISM 251 (2004).
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the Court's reasoning appears, even as
passions have cooled over seven years.
This section reviews Bush v. Gore, developing its activist reasoning. Then, it
compares the Court's approach with that
of the In re Marriage Cases and suggests
another set of questions that one might
ask those who are crying activism today.
In Bush, the Supreme Court granted
review on two distinct questions. The
first was whether the standard adopted
by the state supreme court violated Article II (dealing with voting rights); the second was "whether the use of standardless
manual recounts violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses. '' 43 But
the per curiam decision rested on the
equal protection argument.
Recognizing that individual citizens
have no right to vote for electors for President and that the states maintain plenary power to appoint the electors, the
Court argued that once the state gives
the right to its citizens, the right becomes
a fundamental right. Further, each vote
must be accorded equal weight. 44 The apportionment cases (considered activist in
their day by conservatives)45 support that
proposition reasonably well.
The constitutional error, however,
was trickier. The specific constitutional

errors that the Court found were twofold.
The first error was the lack of identifiable
standards to determine the intent of the
voter. 46 Here, the Court cited from the record to show how practices varied from
county to county and even within the
same county. As the dissenting Justices
argued, the Court should have given the
47
state the time to remedy that defect.
The second reason why Florida's procedure violated equal protection was remarkable for a number of reasons.
According to the per curiam opinion,
Florida violated equal protection by
treating differently voters who undervoted (those who did not properly separate the chad from the ballot) and those
who over-voted (those who indicated
more than one candidate on their ballots;
the most notorious cases involved the
butterfly ballots that had some Jewish
voters voting for holocaust denier Pat
Buchanan48): ". . . the citizen who marks
two candidates in a way discernible by
the machine will not have the same opportunity to have his vote count, even if a
manual examination of the ballot would
" 49
reveal the requisite indicia of intent.
Recognizing that the state might be able
to come up with a workable standard, the
Court found that the state lacked the

43. Bush, 531 U.S. at 103 (2000).
44. Id. at 104.
45. See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (characterizing the
majority's opinion as a "massive repudiation of the experience of our whole past" and a demonstration of "destructively novel judicial power"); Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533, 591 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe
Court's action ... amounts to nothing less than an exercise of the amending power by this Court.").
46. Bush, 531 U.S. at 105-06.
47. Id. at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
48. See Carol Marbin Miller & Jason Grotto, Elderly Jewish Voters Say They Were Confused by Butterfly
Ballot, MIAMI HERALD, Nov. 13, 2000.
49. Bush, 531 U.S. at 108.
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time in which to put such a plan in
place. 5°
There are many problems with the
decision, including the fact that the state
would not have known about the necessary procedures that the Supreme Court
mandated and subsequently faulted it for
not following because in the earlier trip to
the Supreme Court, the Court did not intimate such a procedure. But some specific problems with the Court's analysis
relate directly to my thesis.
Judged by traditional conservative
principles of federalism and judicial restraint, Bush v. Gore is a whopper. The
opinion made no attempt to tie the decision to the original understanding of the
Constitution.Further, the majority
showed no deference to state law, in contravention of the usual conservative mantra, favoring states' rights.5 2 While one
might argue that the Court had a special
role in light of problems with the democratic process, Florida had in place other
procedures, including certification of results, which would have involved the
state legislature.93 A restrained judiciary
would have stayed its hand and let the
political process play out.

Further evidence of the activism of
the decision is its willingness to decide
the case on equal protection grounds. Initially, the Court ignored a serious standing issue: the equal protection right, if
one existed, was the right of a person who
had voted for two candidates and who
had indicated in some meaningful way
his true intent. Voters did not bring the
challenge; George W. Bush did. Historically, conservative Justices have invoked
standing to limit the Court's role, consis54
tent with principles of judicial restraint.
Further, had the Court considered the
only plausible basis of standing, third
party standing, it would have had to extend that doctrine considerably to reach
5
the question in Bush v. Gore. 5
The strongest evidence of judicial activism comes from close scrutiny of the
constitutional right that Florida violated.
Remarkably, the Court cited no authority
for the proposition that a state violates
equal protection if it does not have in
place a mechanism to deal with over- and
under-inclusive ballots. While the Court
cited various voting rights cases, the specific guarantee is a dramatic expansion of
existing case law, one of those radical departures from existing law that conserva-

50. Id. at 111.
51. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 155-57 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
52. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 142 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); see also Steven G. Calabresi, The Originalist
and Normative Case Against JudicialActivism: A Reply to Professor Randy Barnett, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1081,
1091 (2005) (stating that federalism concerns are one of conservatives' "standard critique of judicial activism").
53. Bush, 531 U.S. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
54. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, (1993) 42 DuKE L.J. 1219, 1220
(1993) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court for some time has recognized standing as a constitutionally based doctrine designed to implement the Framers' concept of'the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a democratic
society.'").
55. See Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The PoliticalEconomy of
Bush v. Gore, 54 VANO. L. REV. 1849, 1869-70 (2001).
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tives have railed against. Conservatives
often cite such disregard for settled law
as a measure of judicial activism.5 r Not
only was this a novel equal protection
right, not supported by any traditional
interpretation of equal protection,57 but it
was also not even a modest extension of
prior case law. It was a quantum leap.
Indeed, the Court was insistent that the
decision applied to the facts before the
Court, 5 again suggesting that the Court
was not relying on widely accepted law.
No doubt, the state court was treating those two groups of voters differently.
But any student of Constitutional Law
knows that differential treatment does
not prove an equal protection violation.
Sorting out the legality of disparate
treatment of different groups is an art
form, with an elaborate body of case law
defining levels of scrutiny that a court
should apply in examining the relevant
law. But the Court did little to justify
why this disparity was entitled to the
close scrutiny that Court seemed to apply. The Court does cite cases finding the
9
right to vote to be a fundamental right.5
Those cases are readily distinguishable,

involving disproportionate representation state wide or racial discrimination at
the polls. 6 Instead, the kinds of"discrimination" in Bush v. Gore have been endemic in our system for years. For
example, no one has questioned practices
where some wealthy voting districts have
better equipment than poorer districts,
resulting in more accurately counted
votes in the wealthy districts. Nor has
anyone challenged widely differing voting
procedures from state to state. Were the
Court serious about strict scrutiny when
states count votes differently, the apparent theory in Bush v. Gore, those practices may be subject to challenge.
Further, even if the Court applies
strict scrutiny, governmental action may
be constitutional nonetheless. That turns
on whether the state has a compelling interest and whether the state has narrowly tailored its action to meet that
interest. Nowhere did Bush v. Gore address the state's interest in the disparate
treatment of over- and under-inclusive
ballots.61 I suspect that the state could
have justified looking at under-inclusive
ballots because partially indented chads

56. Orin S. Kerr, Upholding the Law, LEGAL AFFAIRS, Mar./Apr. 2003, available at http://
www.legalaffairs.org/issues/March-April-2003/feature-maraprO3_kerr.msp ("A second manifestation of the activist impulse could be called precedent activism: judicial decision making that changes a prior judicial rule or
announces a creative interpretation of a statute, usually rejecting a rule that the judges dislike as a policy
matter in favor of one they prefer.").
57. By comparison to Justice Scalia's "tradition" laden opinion in Burnham, neither the per curiam opinion nor the Chief Justice's concurring opinion in which Justice Scalia joined used the word "tradition" or "traditional," a hint that there was nothing traditional at all about the new constitutional right found by the Court.
58. Bush, 531 U.S. at 109 ("Our consideration is limited to the present circumstances, for the problem of
equal protection in election processes generally presents many complexities.").
59. Id. at 104-05.
60. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
61. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 100-122; see also Bush, 531 U.S. at 134 (Souter, J., dissenting) ("I can conceive
of no legitimate state interest served by these differing treatments of the expressions of voters' fundamental
rights.").
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may signal intention whereas most overinclusive ballots will not.
From my perspective, Bush v. Gore is
a radical departure from precedent, a
case ignoring the existing procedures to
handle the problem and substituting the
judgment of unelected judges for various
state actors. Despite that, few conservative commentators criticized the decision.
Some tried to justify the decision by criticizing the state court's decision as somehow illegitimate. 62 Judge Posner argued
that we were facing a national constitutional crisis. 63 These arguments are
plausible, but when they come from conservatives who ordinarily preach restraint, federalism, and narrow
64
interpretation of constitutional rights,
the arguments ring hollow.
During the current presidential campaign, John McCain has sounded the typical criticism about activist judges and
promises to appoint judges who interpret
the law, not make it. 65 He criticized the
California Supreme Court and claimed
that the court's "moral authority . .
quickly vanishes when a court presumes
to make law instead of apply it."66 That is

the same criticism from the right wing
over the years.6 7 That is the same criticism aimed at Chief Justice George and
his colleagues in the majority in the recent marriage cases. For example, as
cited by the Weekly Standard, Princeton
Professor of Jurisprudence Robert P.
George decried the decision as "a fairly
conventional liberal judicial activist decision." 68 He explained further, "These
guys had the votes, and they rammed it
through. They don't regard the will of the
people of California as worthy of their
particular concern." 69 Elsewhere, a commentator suggested "If the Chief Justice
wishes to make law instead of interpreting it, he should quit masquerading as a
judge ."70
Not always clear from discussions on
the blogs and in the news, the state supreme court did not find that California's
traditional marriage law was a violation
of equal protection because it did not recognize same sex marriages. Instead, the
court found that the legislature discriminated against same sex couples when it
created domestic partnerships or civil unions, but maintained a separate name for

62.

Robert F. Nagel, From U.S. v. Nixon to Bush v. Gore,
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See
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2000

Dec. 25, 2000.
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(2001).

64. See, e.g., ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1989); Robert F. Nagel, Bowing to Precedent, WEEKLY STANDARD, Apr. 17, 2006.
65. See Elizabeth Bumiller, McCain Assures Conservatives of His Stance on Judges, N.Y. TIMES, May 7,
2008, at A22.
66. Dahlia Lithwick, Who You CallingActivist?, SLATE, May 15, 2008, available at www.slate.comntoolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2191500.
67. See, e.g., MARK R. LEVIN, MEN IN BLACK: How THE SUPREME COURT IS DESTROYING AMERICA (2005).
68. John McCormack, California'sGift to McCain?, WEEKLY STANDARD, May 26, 2008.
69. Id.
70. Posting by 531137 at Political Base blog, http://www.politicalbase.com/forums/topic/california-marriage-ruling-judicial-activism4389/&page=1 (July 6, 2008, 12:43 EST).
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those unions. 71 The disparate treatment
violated the state constitution's equal
protection guarantee.
Examined closely, In re Marriage
Cases is a reasonably cautious decision
and is a plausible extension of existing
precedent. Although, not likely as a political matter, the court's decision left
open to the legislature a number of solutions that would not have been available
had the court found that equal protection
required same sex marriage in the first
instance. The most obvious legislative
solution would be to overrule civil unions.
Further, the court rebutted the
state's claim that the right to marry had
to be understood historically as a right of
opposite-sex couples alone to marry. Like
any common law court extending existing
precedent, the court relied on its 1948 decision overturning the state's law barring
interracial marriage.7 2 The court drew
close parallels between the arguments
made against interracial marriages and
same sex marriages. Apart from whether
one fully agrees with the analogies or not,
this is the kind of incrementalist argument that typifies common law adjudication. Courts have throughout our history
expanded existing law through analogy,
thereby extending existing precedent to
new contexts. Indeed, anyone who accuses the court of activism should read
the Chief Justice's careful analysis of the
state's arguments and the kinds of arguments made by opponents of interracial
marriage. For someone on the fence on

same sex marriage, I found that argument compelling.
No one can deny that the state did
distinguish between same sex and heterosexual couples. In equal protection case
law, that usually proves little (except
that the text of the equal protection
clause does not resolve many disputes).
Instead, the real question is the level of
scrutiny to be applied to the disparate
treatment. Chief Justice George did a
plausible job explaining why sexual orientation was a suspect classification, and
therefore, presumptively invalid. The
court also found that the state's alleged
interests were barely legitimate, not close
to the requirement that they must be
compelling.
Even if one were to disagree with the
Court's result and find the dissenting
opinions more compelling, disagreement
with the result does not prove that the
judges are activists, not if that term is to
have meaning. As indicated, the opinion
took existing precedent and made a measured step forward.
Anyone who wants "talking points" to
rebut claims that In re Marriage Cases is
an exercise in activism may want to refer
back to my discussion of Bush v. Gore.
There, Bush did not even claim a violation of his own constitutional rights. Instead, the Court invoked the right of
those whose ballots included more than
one presidential candidate. While the
Court found two groups that were treated
differently, no court - or at least the

71. In re Marriage Cases, 43 Cal. 4th 757, 778-79 (2008). This argument has proved unsuccessful for
litigants in other states. See, e.g., Conaway v. Deane, 401 Md. 219 (2007).
72. Perez v. Sharp, 32 Cal. 2d 711 (1948).
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Court cited no court - had ever found
that voters had a right to have their vote
treated "equally" in the manner suggested by the Court. Further, while the
courts have often applied strict scrutiny
to voting rights cases, Bush v.Gore failed
to explain why a similar level of scrutiny
was required for over- vs. under-inclusive
voters. Given the absence of any historical discrimination against over-inclusive
voters or other voter fraud, one wonders
why strict scrutiny would have been in
order. The disparate treatment would
appear to be a result of practical impossibility of sorting out the intent of those
who over-voted, not some kind of corrupt
motive on the part of the vote counters
(unlike the situation in traditional voting
rights cases cited by the Bush court).
A few other comparisons between the
Marriage Cases and Bush v. Gore are
worth making. Bush v. Gore had the additional "activist" feature of a federal
court intruding upon state actors. Further, the federal actors were unelected
judges, not judges like those in California
who are subject to the will of the voters.
In re MarriageCases starts to seem tame
by comparison.
IV. Conclusion
At the outset, I promised a novel solution to the problem of the overuse of the
term "judicial activism." My proposal is
simple: we should ban the term from the
English language. The term is meaningless. Were we to ban it, critics would be
forced to discuss real policy differences
with court decisions. If critics think that
the decision is activist because it was not

grounded on precedent, we can argue
when a court should be able to extend existing precedent. If the objection is that
the decision was anti-majoritarian, we
can debate when a court should be able to
override the popular will. In recent
years, conservatives have routinely
sought relief from legislation with which
they disagreed and courts, often the Supreme Court, have sided with them on issues from property rights to gun rights to
claims of reverse discrimination. I could
add other possible objections, but the key
point is that in a world without the term
"judicial activism," the debate might shed
some light on the proper role of the courts
in a pluralistic and dynamic society. Lots
of luck fostering that debate.

